Cognitive Bias Modification for anxious interpretations (CBM-I) is a computerized training program designed to reduce threatening interpretations of ambiguous information. In addition to testing the efficacy of CBM-I for contamination fear on various cognitive outcomes and emotional vulnerability, the current study examined whether the content of CBM-I must match a person's fear domain to be efficacious, and examined the moderating role of preexisting interpretation bias on CBM-I's efficacy. Participants (n = 121) high in contamination fear were assigned to one session of either CBM-I focused on contamination fear content, CBM-I focused on height fear content, or a sham control condition. Planned contrasts indicated that fear domain match does tend to enhance CBM-I's effects: compared to the heights condition, those in the contamination training condition improved on five of the eight cognitive bias-related variables, though there was no change on measures of emotional vulnerability. In contrast, there was little difference between the heights training and sham conditions. Minimal evidence was found for baseline interpretation bias as a moderator. Results support the use of CBM-I that matches the fear domain of the participant, regardless of baseline bias level.
Introduction
Although exposure therapy is currently the gold standard treatment for most forms of anxiety, it does not help all clients and many people refuse or drop out of exposure therapy (e.g., Garcia-Palacios, Botella, Hoffman, & Fabregat, 2007) . Still more individuals who are suffering do not come in for therapy (e.g., the World Health Organization estimates that in the Americas, over half of those with anxiety disorders have never received treatment; Kohn, Saxena, Levav, & Saraceno, 2004) . Thus, there is a need for additional interventions that can help meet the large treatment gap. Cognitive Bias Modification paradigms seem likely to help meet this need (see (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009; Woud & Becker, 2014) . In particular, Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretations (CBM-I) is a computer-based training designed to reduce the tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a disorder-congruent way. This bias is targeted because it causally contributes to the initiation and maintenance of anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) . Given these computer-based programs do not require a therapist, they have high potential as costeffective and easy to disseminate interventions. Moreover, they do not require individuals to directly confront their feared situations, as occurs in exposure therapy, which may enhance the acceptability of the training and reduce attrition, compared to exposure-based treatments.
While many results examining the impact of CBM-I are encouraging (see meta-analysis by Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) , there are many unanswered questions about the usefulness of CBM-I as an intervention (see Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014) . Along these lines, the current study examined whether the fear domain (e.g., contamination fear vs. height fear) targeted by the training must match that of the participant for training to have a positive impact on a range of fear-relevant cognitive outcomes and emotional vulnerability, and whether the impact of CBM-I was moderated by pre-existing interpretation bias. Specifically, persons high in contamination fear were assigned to either contamination-fear CBM-I (fear domain match), height-fear CBM-I (fear domain mismatch), or a sham control condition.
Contamination fear is marked by an interpretation bias that is characterized by the overestimation of threat and an inflated sense of responsibility related to negative outcomes (e.g., Rachman, 2004; Wheaton, Abramowitz, Berman, Riemann, & Hale, 2010) . Moreover, researchers have identified a strong link between the approach/avoidance behavior of compulsive hand washers toward potential contaminants (a hallmark symptom of contamination fear) and interpretation bias. Specifically, behavioral outcomes on an avoidance task correlated with participants' estimates of the dangerousness of potential contaminants (Jones & Menzies, 1997) , pointing to the potential clinical value of targeting interpretation biases in contamination fear.
Importance of fear domain match
To our knowledge, no studies have experimentally examined the impact of fear domain match within anxiety domains in CBM-I. It may be that training needs to target the person's specific concerns for learning to occur; alternatively, it may be that the key is learning how to assign benign interpretations in potentially threatening situations, regardless of domain, suggesting the necessary element is changing the process rather than the content. While at least two previous studies presented evidence that training in one domain transferred to interpretations related to another domain (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2010) , we are interested in experimentally manipulating the training content to permit causal inferences about the impact of training/outcome match on CBM-I outcomes.
If fear domain match does not significantly improve the outcomes of training, the result may have important implications for those with comorbid anxiety pathology. Indeed, anxiety disorders are highly comorbid (Barlow, 2002) , so if the learning accumulated during CBM-I in one fear domain could generalize or transfer to other problem areas, total treatment time could conceivably be reduced. While intuitively, it may be expected that those receiving a training targeting their specific fear domain would improve to a greater degree than those receiving a training not targeting their specific fear domain, existing studies in the exposure therapy literature suggest that treatment for one type of fear can, indeed, generalize to other fear domains. For instance, participants who underwent a single exposure therapy session for one or two of their agoraphobic fears (e.g., walking across a bridge) also improved significantly in their other, untreated fears at a second session (Williams, Kinney, & Falbo, 1989) . Further, there is evidence from the CBM literature that child samples with a mix of different anxiety difficulties can benefit from a general anxiety CBM training where materials are not specifically matched to the individual's concerns (Bar-Haim, Morag, & Glickman, 2011) , and the attention bias modification literature has found training effects using negative words or images that are not necessarily disorder-linked (See, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009 ). Thus, we test two competing hypotheses: that fear domain match will lead to better outcomes than the non-matched training, or that content area is not that important, so CBM-I that matches and that does not match will both lead to healthier fear-relevant cognitive outcomes, relative to a control condition.
Importance of pre-existing interpretation bias
A key issue to determine who will benefit from CBM-I concerns the moderating role of pre-existing bias. Some studies have found that post-training change in interpretation bias was more robust for those with higher pre-existing negative interpretation bias (socially anxious adolescents: Salemink & Wiers, 2011; depressed adolescents: Micco, Henin, & Hirshfeld-Becker, 2014) , presumably because CBM-I addressed a key weakness for these individuals. However, other research has not found this effect (Steinman, 2010) . Theoretically, the absence of interpretation bias in anxious individuals suggests the presence of an alternate primary mechanism driving their anxiety (e.g., other forms of cognitive bias, high avoidance, etc.), indicating that a training primarily designed to reduce negative interpretation bias may be a suboptimal treatment option. Notwithstanding, some individuals with impairing anxiety have minimal negative interpretation bias. It is possible that training could still help these individuals because it may help them capitalize on an existing strength, or their interpretation style could be more malleable and become more positive. The current study thus examined pre-existing interpretation bias as a potential moderator of outcomes. Importantly, moderation was tested for a variety of fear-relevant cognitive outcomes to determine if pre-existing bias is critical for some outcomes but not others, which may help make sense of prior mixed findings.
Importance of various cognitive outcomes
Though research on CBM-I is increasing, much remains unknown about the range of outcomes it affects. Given it is a cognitively-focused training, it is important to evaluate the different types of cognitive outcomes influenced by CBM-I, especially outcomes that are commonly associated with more well-established treatments (e.g., cognitive behavioral therapy; CBT). One common finding across CBM-I studies is a reduction in maladaptive interpretation biases (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) , as would be expected. In addition, we found that CBM-I with an obsessional sample led to a greater reduction in obsessive beliefs compared to a control condition (Beadel, Smyth, & Teachman, 2014 ).
In the current study, eight cognitive factors were examined as dependent variables. Several previous CBM-I studies have used alternative or multiple cognitive dependent measures, but they mostly seem to be assessing interpretation bias in a novel way (e.g., Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Remmerswaal, & Vreden, 2009; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007) , while one also measured memory bias (Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011) . In addition to standard indices of positive and negative interpretation bias used in the CBM-I literature, the current study examined beliefs about anxiety controllability (Gallagher, Naragon-Gainey, & Brown, 2014) , the severity of catastrophic outcomes (van PeskiOosterbaan, Spinhoven, van der Does, Bruschke, & Rooijmans, 1999), self-efficacy (Muris, 2002) , beliefs about distress tolerance (Keough, Riccardi, Timpano, Mitchell, & Schmidt, 2010) 
Overview
In summary, the current study tested some of the boundary conditions tied to CBM-I among a contamination-fearful sample, including the importance of the fear domain match targeted in training, the role of pre-existing interpretation bias, and the types of fear-relevant cognitive outcomes effected by CBM-I. This first study testing fear domain match was designed as a 'proof-of-principle' study, so involved only one training session with an analogue sample and emphasized cognitive outcomes expected to change relatively rapidly, rather than broader symptom measures, which we presumed would require a lengthier intervention. Notwithstanding, we include some measures of post-training emotional vulnerability. However, due to the reasons outlined above and prior mixed results for effects on emotional vulnerability following single-session CBM-I studies (e.g., null findings in Beadel et al., 2014) , we do not have strong expectations for robust change on these measures, though we believe that any change that would occur would be in the direction of reduced anxious arousal, disgust, and behavioral avoidance.
Methods

Participants
Participants were 121 undergraduate students recruited from a pre-screening survey battery based on their responses to the contamination subscale of the Padua Inventory -Revised (PI-R; Burns et al., 1996) , a questionnaire measuring obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Participants were included if they scored at or above the mean of a previously diagnosed obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) sample (M = 13.87, SD = 7.96), resulting in a mean score of 16.61 (SD = 6.11) for our study sample. 1 Additionally, the total sample had a mean age of 18.67 (SD = .94), was 73.6% female, and race was reported as 46.2% Caucasian, 37.6% Asian, 6.8% African American, 8.6%
1 In addition to recruiting based on PI-R score, to ensure adequate representation across the full range of the interpretation bias distribution, a final subset of participants (N = 12) were recruited for being either particularly high or low in baseline interpretation bias so that this variable could be more effectively examined as a moderator across analyses. The cut-off criterion was scoring above or below one half standard deviation of the mean RR-NEG score for the current sample at the time of this decision (M = 2.65, SD = .49). Thus, participants were recruited if they scored above 2.90, or below 2.41 on the RR-NEG. They also still had to meet our PI-R criteria. Those high in baseline interpretation bias were then randomly assigned to one of the two training conditions, and the same for those low in baseline interpretation bias.
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Materials Baseline Symptom Measure
The Padua Inventory -Washington State University Revision Contamination Subscale (PI-R; Burns et al., 1996) .
The PI-R is a 39-item self-report questionnaire that assesses the severity of OC symptoms. In the present study, only the 10 items from the contamination/washing subscale were used. The subscale has been shown to have adequate psychometric properties (Burns et al., 1996) . The Cronbach's alpha for the baseline laboratory administration of this measure was .77.
Training Contamination-Relevant Interpretation Biases
Development of Training Stimuli.
A modified version of the Ambiguous Scenarios Training paradigm (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000) was used to train benign interpretations in the current study. Participants read and imagined themselves in 34 unique scenarios, which were repeated three times in a row with varying modifications (see below). Each scenario was three sentences long, with the last sentence ending in a word fragment that was missing a single letter. The scenarios were designed to be emotionally ambiguous until the final word fragment was completed. Participants were asked to type in the missing letter of the word fragment, which resolved the ambiguity in a positive, or contamination fear-incongruent, manner. Roughly half of the scenarios resolved the ambiguity by reinforcing the improbability of a negative occurrence or outcome, and the other half reinforced the ability to tolerate or cope with anxiety should a negative event occur. An example scenario was, "You are doing laundry and take a freshly washed load of clothes out of the dryer. When moving them, the basket tumbles, spilling some of the clothes onto the floor. The need to re-wash the clothes is l_w." The final word fragment in the scenario ("low") resolved the ambiguity with an interpretation inconsistent with contamination fear. See the online Appendix [add link] for sample materials from each training condition. After completing each word fragment by typing the letter "o" on the keyboard, participants answered a comprehension question designed to reinforce the resolution of the scenario by typing "Y" to indicate yes or "N" for no. Participants were unable to advance in the training unless they completed the word fragment and answered the comprehension question correctly. The comprehension question for the scenario above is, "Is it necessary to rewash your freshly cleaned clothes?," for which the participant would have to type "N" for No.
Following other studies from our lab (e.g., Steinman & Teachman, 2014) , we used multiple iterations of the training set to reinforce the modification of interpretation bias. After completing the first round as described above, participants were then instructed to read each scenario and comprehension question out loud (similar to Steinman & Teachman, 2014) . The third time, participants saw the same scenarios but with a blank space in place of the final word fragment. Participants were instructed to write down the (completed) word fragment previously seen, or a synonym for that word, on a numbered sheet. Specifically, these modifications were designed to help participants sustain attention to the training materials, which we expected would lead to stronger learning than would be the case if they had simply read them one time. In particular, having participants read aloud in the second iteration ensured that the scenarios were being fully read (so the participant was not simply attending to the word fragment), and the final iteration encouraged participants to consider the meaning of the scenario ending.
Training Conditions.
1) The Contamination condition was designed to alter maladaptive contamination-relevant interpretations, and targeted the four obsessive-compulsive belief domains linked to contamination concerns (OCCWG, 2004) : inflated responsibility, overestimation of threat, perfectionism, and intolerance of uncertainty. 2) The Heights condition was Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, Volume 7 (2016) , Issue 1, designed to alter maladaptive heights-relevant interpretations, and targeted management and tolerance of height fear, as well as reducing catastrophic thinking while on a height. An example of a Heights scenario was, "You are standing at the edge of a train platform. You look down and notice that the distance from the platform to the tracks is greater than you previously thought. Standing on the edge makes you feel uneasy, but you know you will remain saf_." 3) The Sham condition was similar in structure (i.e., length and format) to the active training condition, but its content was not related to fear or anxiety and it was not intended to modify interpretations. This control condition has been used in other CBM studies (e.g., Steinman & Teachman, 2014 ). An example of a Sham scenario was, "You are walking through your local supermarket doing some grocery shopping. You notice that there is soft background music playing. You realize the song is one you have heard bef_re." Additionally, each condition contained nine filler scenarios within each of the three rounds, which were similar to Sham scenarios (i.e., not relevant to anxiety and not intended to train interpretations). These filler scenarios were the same across conditions, and were included to help mask the purpose of training for those in the active conditions.
Training Effects on Contamination Fear-relevant Cognitive Outcomes
Interpretations Bias: Recognition Ratings (modified from Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).
To measure change in contamination-relevant interpretation bias, participants engaged in a task which allowed them to make their own interpretations of ambiguous contamination-relevant scenarios. Specifically, participants first read scenarios which were similar in structure to the contamination training scenarios, except that they remained ambiguous even after completion of the final word fragment. Each situation was accompanied by a short title. A sample scenario was, "THE HOTEL: You stay overnight in a hotel you've never been to before. The employee at the front desk tells you the room was cleaned just before you arrived. When you enter your room, you notice a thin layer of dust near the _indow." Following each scenario was a comprehension question (for the scenario above, "Did the hotel employee tell you your room had been cleaned?"). Similar to training, participants could not advance until the correct letter key was pressed, and until the comprehension question was answered correctly.
After participants completed four of these scenarios, they were instructed to work on a jigsaw puzzle for three minutes as a distracter task. They were then presented with the title of each scenario they had previously read (e.g., "THE HOTEL") along with four possible interpretive resolutions to the scenario. One of the possible resolutions was a positive, OCD-incongruent interpretation (for the above example, the resolution in this category was, "As you put your things down, you are fine to stay in that room because the danger of getting sick from germs is low."); one was a negative, OCD-congruent interpretation ("As you put your things down, you feel the urge to change rooms because you are worried about the danger of getting sick from germs."); one was a positive, OCD-unrelated interpretation ("As you put your things down, you are happy because you like that the room has a huge flat screen TV."); and one was a negative, OCD-unrelated interpretation ("As you put your things down, you feel the urge to change rooms because the TV isn't working."). Participants separately rated each resolution for how similar it was in meaning to what they remembered of the original scenario on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ("Very Different in Meaning") to 4 ("Very Similar in Meaning"). Because the scenarios remained emotionally ambiguous, ratings reflected the participants' own interpretation of the scenarios. Participants completed four Recognition Rating items at baseline, and then four unique items at post-training. The Recognition Ratings task yielded both a positive (RR-POS) and negative (RR-NEG) interpretation score that was created by taking the sum of the ratings for the four positive and four negative responses, respectively.
2 The positive and negative scores were also converted to z-scores to standardize them across the two unique sets of Recognition Rating items. Chronbach's alpha for each version of the recognition ratings (positive and negative, version 1 or 2, pre-and post-training administration) ranged from .66-.80, with a mean of .72. The ACQ's emotion control subscale is a psychometrically sound, 5-item self-report measure of perceived ability to effectively control one's emotions. Participants rated their responses to each item on a 6-point Likert scale (0 = "Strongly disagree"; 5 = "Strongly agree"). In the current study, Cronbach's alpha was .83 at baseline and .87 at posttraining.
Obsessive Beliefs: Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire -Short Form (OBQ: OCCWG, 2005).
The OBQ is a 44-item measure of beliefs typical of OCD, divided into three subscales: Inflated Responsibility/Overestimation of Threat, Perfectionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty, and Importance/Control of Thoughts. In the present study, only the 23 items from the Inflated Responsibility/Overestimation of Threat and Perfectionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty subscales were used, given these subscales predicted scores on the contamination subscale of the PI-R, while the Importance/Control of Thoughts subscale did not (OCCWG). Participants rated their agreement with each item using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = "Disagree very much"; 7 = "Agree very much"). In the current study, Cronbach's alpha was .90 at baseline and .91 at post-training.
Self-Efficacy Beliefs: Self-Efficacy Questionnaire -Specific Phobias (SEQ-SP; Flatt & King, 2009).
The SEQ-SP is a 14-item self-report questionnaire measuring perceived self-efficacy in relation to a specific feared stimulus, such as how certain one would be that their physiology and cognitions would remain normal, or that they could cope and manage, if they were to come into contact with a feared object. Participants rated responses on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 indicated "Really certain I wouldn't", and 5 indicated "Really certain I would." The scale was shown to be a single-factor, and have excellent reliability and validity (Flatt & King, 2009 ). In the current sample, Cronbach's alpha for the SEQ-SP was .86 at baseline and .87 at post-training.
Catastrophic Cognitions: Contamination Cognitions Scale (CCS; Deacon & Olatunji, 2007).
The CCS is a psychometrically strong, 13-item self-report measure of the tendency to overestimate the likelihood (CCS-L) and severity or "badness" (CCS-B) of contamination, resulting in two separate scales. Each item presents an object commonly associated with contamination (e.g., toilet seats in public restrooms), and participants are asked to rate the likelihood and severity of contamination for each object on a 0-100 scale where 0 indicated "not at all likely/bad", and 100 indicated "extremely likely/bad". In the current study, Cronbach's alpha for the likelihood scale was .90 at baseline and .91 at post-training, and was .91 at baseline and .92 at post-training for the severity of contamination scale.
Beliefs about Distress Tolerance: Distress Tolerance Scale (DTS; Simons & Gaher, 2005).
The DTS is a 15-item self-report questionnaire measuring perceived ability to tolerate distress. The scale has excellent psychometric properties, and a single higher-order factor and four first-order factors: tolerance, appraisal, absorption, and regulation (Simons & Gaher, 2005) . Participants rated responses on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = "Strongly agree"; 5 = "Strongly disagree). In the current sample, Cronbach's alpha for the total scale was .82 at baseline and .84 at post-training.
Modification of Measures
For the current study, items from the measures that were not initially geared to reflect contamination fear-relevant cognitive outcomes (namely, the DTS, SEQ-SP, and ACQ) were modified in two ways. First, items were altered to be relevant to contamination concerns. This provided a more stringent test of the fear domain match question because we were looking at change specific to the individual's fear domain, rather than changes in general cognitive processes. Second, the tense of each item was altered to indicate future intentions. This adjustment was made due to the theoretical conceptualization of "anxious apprehension" as a state focused on the threat and uncertainty of potential future events (Barlow, 2002, p. 64) , and we expected it to show greater sensitivity to change (vs. referencing their present state twice during the same experimental session). For example, an original item from the Anxiety Control Questionnaire is, "I can usually put worrisome thoughts out of my mind easily" (Rapee et al., 1996) . This item became, "If I want to, I will be able to put worrisome thoughts about contamination out of my mind easily."
Evaluating the Effect of Training on Responses to Contamination-Relevant Stressors
Although the cognitive outcomes are the primary focus in the current report because of our interest in different forms of cognitive change in response to interpretation bias training that varies in fear domain match, we also measured responses to contamination-relevant stressors. Specifically, after training, participants were asked to engage in two tasks to measure their approach behavior to potential contaminants. Also, their peak task fear and disgust were verbally assessed using a 0-100 Subjective Units of Distress Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1990) , where 0 indicates a total absence of the emotion and 100 indicates the strongest presence of the emotion they could imagine. Before both tasks, participants were reminded that if they became too uncomfortable during any portion of the task and felt the need to stop, to let the experimenter know and the task would end immediately.
Bandaid Task (modified from Green & Teachman, 2012).
In this task, participants were asked to touch the white space on a large Bandaid designed to look like it had been in contact with blood. The participants were told, "Here is a Bandaid that has been in direct contact with an open human wound. This Bandaid is an everyday object used in an everyday way. For this task, I'd like you to touch this part of the Bandaid with two fingers for as long as you're willing without lifting your fingers for up to 2 minutes." The degree of approach was measured by the length of time participants were willing to touch the Bandaid.
Trash Task (modified from Beadel et al., 2014).
For this task, participants were shown a pen and a trash can filled with materials designed to look like real trash, but that were actually made from clean materials. They were told that they would be asked to engage with some "everyday objects." The experimenter said, "What I am going to do is take this clean pen and rub it around the inside of this trash can and then ask you to touch it in various ways, including touching it with your hands, and touching it to your face and lips." Wearing a latex glove, the experimenter then rubbed the pen around the inside of the trashcan for two full rotations. Participants were then asked to come into increasingly close contact with the pen, including touching it with their hands, and then rubbing it on their arm, cheek, lips, and finally, rubbing it on a cracker and taking a bite. Approach was measured by adding the number of steps in the hierarchy that were completed, from step 1 ("If you're willing, please rub one finger along the length of this pen") to step 6 ("If you're willing, please open this pack of crackers, rub the length of the pen on one of the crackers and take a bite").
Procedure
All participants received informed consent upon arrival at the study, and were told that they would be participating in a computer-based intervention designed to change their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. They were then informed that they would be asked to complete two tasks that require them to interact with everyday objects. Also, in order to prevent coercion, participants were also reminded on numerous occasions that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study or stop any task at any time without penalty. Following informed consent, the experimenter collected baseline SUDS ratings for anxiety and disgust. Participants then completed baseline questionnaires (presented in randomized order), which included six of the contamination fear-relevant cognitive outcomes [OBQ (obsessive beliefs), DTS (beliefs about distress tolerance), SEQ-SP (self-efficacy), ACQ-EC (anxiety controllability), and CCS-B (contamination severity), CCS-L (contamination likelihood)] and the measure of contamination symptoms (PI-R). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three training conditions: contamination training (N = 39), heights training (N = 41), or sham training (N = 41). Before the training began, participants completed Recognition Ratings (RR-POS and RR-NEG) to measure baseline contamination-relevant positive and negative interpretation bias. Researchers were blind to training condition assignment, and wore headphones during the training portions that were read aloud. After the training session, participants completed another set of Recognition Ratings (using new scenarios), followed by a demographics form, and a second administration of the other cognitive measures. The experimenter then collected post-training SUDS ratings, and participants completed the Bandaid and Trash tasks in counterbalanced order. Participants then underwent a funnel debriefing to check for believability of the deception used in the stressor tasks, before being fully debriefed. Last, a final anxiety SUDS rating was collected and relaxation exercises were administered, if needed, to minimize postexperiment residual anxiety. This study received Institutional Review Board approval prior to data collection.
Results
Sample characteristics
The three training groups ("Contamination", "Heights" and "Sham") did not differ by gender (χ Table 2 for means and standard deviations for the dependent variables at baseline and post-training by condition. Impact of fear domain match and pre-existing interpretation bias on effects of CBM-I.
Repeated-measures analyses of variance (RM ANOVAs) were conducted for each of the dependent cognitive variables using three planned contrasts designed to test the two competing hypotheses. The training condition contrasts were: 1) Contamination vs. Heights, 2) Contamination vs. Sham, and 3) Heights vs. Sham. 3 The Contamination vs. Heights condition allows for examination of whether stronger training effects emerge when the training matches the participants' fear domain, while the Contamination vs. Sham condition examines whether the fear-matched CBM-I condition is an effective training, relative to a control condition. Finally, the Heights vs. Sham comparison clarifies whether the non fear-matched condition does exert some training effects beyond the control condition. For each RM ANOVA, time (pre-vs. post-training) was the within-subjects factor and condition was the between-subjects factor. Baseline interpretation bias was also included as a moderator to examine the impact of baseline interpretation bias. Similar to Mobini et al. (2014) , a baseline interpretation bias score was created by subtracting the negative baseline Recognition Ratings mean score from the positive baseline Recognition Ratings mean score, yielding a composite score such that a positive value indicates a positive baseline interpretation bias and a negative score indicates a negative baseline bias. This baseline interpretation bias score was included as a continuous moderator for each of the dependent variables. The only exception was for positive and negative interpretation bias; to examine moderation of pre-existing interpretation bias for the interpretation bias variables, we did not use the baseline interpretation bias score to avoid the same variable being included as both a moderator and dependent variable. As a result, in the analysis for positive interpretation bias, only baseline negative interpretation bias was examined as a moderator, and likewise, for the negative interpretation bias analysis, only baseline positive interpretation bias was examined. Paired and independent-samples t-tests were used to follow-up significant main effects and interactions (for these tests, a median split approach was used to create high and low baseline interpretation bias groups). The results are presented in Table 3 .
For the Bandaid and Trash stressor tasks, univariate ANOVAs were conducted for each of the planned contrasts to examine mean differences at post-training for the peak SUDS ratings and the behavioral approach indicator, while including pre-existing interpretation bias as a moderator. Of note, the funnel debriefing revealed that while only .9% (N = 1) did not believe the deception in the Trash task, approximately 18% (N = 19) of participants did not believe the deception in the Bandaid task (i.e., that the blood was actual blood from a human wound).
Results Overview
As evident in Table 3 , when comparing the fear-domain match condition (Contamination) to the non fear-domain match condition (Heights), significant interactions with training condition revealed that the Contamination condition had more positive training effects (operationalized as change in the cognitive variable over time to be less anxietycongruent) for five out of the eight cognitive variables measured: RR-NEG (negative interpretations), ACQ-EC (anxiety controllability), CCS-L (contamination likelihood), CCS-B (contamination severity), and SEQ-SP (selfefficacy). (However, it should be noted that the nature of the RR-NEG interaction appears to be driven by both a nonsignificant improvement in the Contamination condition and a non-significant worsening in the Heights condition.) Notably, when comparing Contamination to the Sham condition, the findings mostly matched those observed for the Contamination vs. Heights comparison, except that the training effect for RR-NEG became non-significant, while the effect for RR-POS was significant. In contrast, when comparing the Heights condition to the Sham condition, the only significant training effect was for the SEQ-SP, which appeared to be driven by a reduction in self-efficacy for those in the Sham condition. This suggests that matching the fear domain to the participants' concerns enhances training effects, and may even be necessary to observe training effects. 3 We do not report omnibus RM ANOVAs that include all three training conditions because of the a priori status of our two competing hypotheses, which were best tested with the planned contrasts. However, we did conduct these omnibus analyses and, consistent with the contrasts reported here, there was a significant condition by time effect for the ACQ, CCS-L, CCS-B, and SEQ (though not for the Recognitions Ratings) at p < .05. Note. RR-POS = Positive Recognition Ratings, RR-NEG = Negative Recognition Ratings, Baseline Interpretation Bias Score is the composite score (RR-POS -RR-NEG) used to examine moderation of baseline interpretation bias in the analyses; ACQ-EC = Anxiety Controllability Questionnaire, Revised, Emotion Control Subscale, OBQ = Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire, SEQ-SP = Self-Efficacy Questionnaire for Specific Phobias, CCS = Contamination Cognitions Scale, DTS = Distress Tolerance Scale, SUDS = Subjective Units of Distress. Note. This table displays the results for each of the 3 planned contrasts (which define the columns) conducted on the cognitive dependent variables (listed down the leftmost column). Each dependent variable was tested for the effects of time, training condition, and their interaction, and the interaction with baseline interpretation bias. All shaded areas indicate significant effects. Two-way (condition by time) interactions are not followed up when they are subsumed by three-way (condition by time by interpretation bias) interactions. ME = main effect, Pre = baseline assessment, Post Journal of Experimental Psychopathology JEP Volume 7 (2016) , Issue 1, 49-71 ISSN 2043-8087 / DOI:10.5127/jep.045414 When examining the moderation of baseline interpretation bias, the effects were inconsistent: the ACQ-EC (anxiety controllability) and SEQ-SP (self-efficacy) were moderated by interpretation bias, but the other variables were not. For anxiety controllability, only those in the Contamination condition (compared to the Sham condition) with a high level of negative interpretation bias showed an increase in perceived anxiety controllability across the training. For self-efficacy, baseline interpretation bias moderated findings in both the Contamination vs. Heights and Contamination vs. Sham comparisons. In both cases, among those with high levels of baseline negative interpretation bias, there was an increase in self-efficacy in the Contamination condition, but not in the Heights or Sham conditions. Additionally, those high in baseline negative interpretation bias in the Sham condition decreased in self-efficacy across training. Also, in the Contamination vs. Heights condition comparison, the Heights condition reported an increase in self-efficacy, but only among those low in baseline negative interpretation bias. 4 Finally, there were no significant training differences for any of the planned contrasts for the behavioral approach or self-report (peak fear and disgust SUDS) outcomes associated with the stressor (Bandaid or trash) tasks (all p > .10). Upon removing individuals who did not believe the deception in the tasks, the results remained mostly the same, so all participants were included in the reported analyses. 5 See Table 4 for the results.
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Discussion
The primary aim of the present study was to determine the importance of fear-domain match and pre-existing interpretation bias on the impact of CBM-I. The findings reveal a fairly consistent overarching pattern, which suggests that CBM-I content that matches the fear-domain of the individual results in a more positive impact on clinicallyrelevant cognition than content that does not match the fear-domain of the individual or a sham condition. Specifically, there was a more reliable impact of training for those in the fear-domain match condition (Contamination) compared to those in the non-match condition (Heights) for negative interpretation bias, anxiety controllability, catastrophic cognitions (both severity and likelihood of a catastrophic outcome), and self-efficacy (though not for positive interpretation bias, obsessive beliefs, or beliefs about distress tolerance). As expected, this overall pattern held when comparing the fear-domain match to the sham condition. Finally, there was little difference between the non feardomain match condition (Heights) and the sham condition, such that only self-efficacy resulted in a training effect, in which there was a significant reduction in self-efficacy only in the sham condition. Additionally, there were no training group differences on any of the behavioral tasks, though, as mentioned previously, we were uncertain whether this single-session of training would result in changes in these very tough tests of emotional vulnerability, and multiple aspects of the tasks were novel so they had not previously been established as valid markers of OC-related behavior.
These findings support the value of CBM-I as a potential intervention for anxiety-related cognition, and this is the first study to our knowledge to examine whether CBM-I impacts multiple cognitive factors that are theorized to contribute to the clinical severity of anxiety, and are targeted by other efficacious anxiety treatments (i.e., CBT). While the current study did not find training effects in reaction to the stressor tasks and the effect sizes for significant effects 4 Based on a reviewer's suggestion, we also reran the main analyses for the Contamination vs. Heights and Heights vs. Sham contrasts while adding CCS-S as a covariate given it showed group differences at baseline. For the Contamination vs. Heights condition, the only significant interaction with time was for self-efficacy, in which there was a three-way interaction for time by condition by baseline interpretation bias. Similar to the original analyses, for the Heights vs. Sham condition, there was only a time by condition interaction for self-efficacy. This shift in findings may reflect that baseline CCS-S shares considerable variance with condition assignment, or may follow from the overlap between baseline CCS-S and baseline interpretation bias (the other covariate included), or it may be due to the loss of power from adding another covariate. Regardless, it points to the importance of replicating these findings in another sample. 5 The only difference in the results upon removing those who did not believe the deception in the Bandaid task was a significant time by condition by baseline interpretation bias interaction between those in the Heights and Sham conditions. Those in the Heights condition with higher baseline interpretation bias reported higher peak anxiety than those in the Sham condition.
were modest, it is notable that this single-session of CBM-I training led to change in multiple forms of catastrophic thinking, perceptions of anxiety controllability, and interpretation bias. Given that multiple (vs. single) sessions of CBM have resulted in a stronger behavioral impact (see Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) , it will be helpful to replicate the current study using multiple training sessions. Additionally, while we expected change in obsessive beliefs using the OBQ, in hindsight we recognize that the instructions, which ask participants to rate statements based on their "typical way of looking at things", may be more likely to show delayed effects given training was a single session, so there was not time for participants to apply their new way of thinking in the 'real' world. Notwithstanding, the observed effects on numerous, previously unexamined, outcome measures points to the potentially broad scope of CBM-I's impact. This impact is notable considering the important advantages that CBM may offer over more traditional treatments for anxiety, such as exposure therapy. CBM-I offers an alternative treatment that may be more palatable to anxious individuals, as well as more cost effective and easier to disseminate due to the computer-based delivery of the program.
One important goal for CBM-I researchers is to strengthen its effects. In the current study, we attempted to enhance participant engagement with the training material, which we expected would lead to more elaborate processing of the training material and stronger effects, by modifying the original ambiguous scenario paradigm (Mathews & Macintosh, 2000) to include three unique iterations of responding to the same training scenarios. While it is unknown the extent to which this modification impacted the findings, there is research to suggest that viewing a stimulus multiple consecutive times is optimal for it to transfer to long-term memory (see Hauptmann & Karni, 2002) . Notably, given participants in all training conditions completed the same three iterations for their set of training materials, we think it unlikely that this change to the original protocol would have dramatically altered the effects of training condition. However, hopefully future research will continue to evaluate modifications to the original paradigm in order to increase the efficacy of CBM-I, and address the not-uncommon finding that CBM-I and control conditions equally reduce a variety of anxiety disorder symptoms (e.g., Salemink, Kindt, Rienties, & van den Hout, 2014) .
One particularly strong training effect in the current study was for an increase in perceived anxiety controllability. This finding is notable in light of recent evidence showing that increases in anxiety controllability across traditional treatment (i.e., CBT) for various anxiety disorders accounted for approximately 80% of symptom improvement in a diverse clinical sample (Gallagher, Naragon-Gainey, & Brown, 2014) . This is in line with cognitive theories of anxiety, which suggest that maladaptive perceptions of anxiety control are crucial in the etiology of clinical anxiety, and that modifying these perceptions may be key to recovery from clinical symptoms (Barlow, 1991) . Due to the central role anxiety controllability plays in anxiety symptom reduction, the effect of CBM-I on anxiety controllability provides additional support for the use of CBM-I as a potential intervention for anxiety.
The issue of fear-domain match is an important question for determining the optimal clinical applications and generalizability of CBM-I. Specifically, given our results suggest that fear-domain match results in a greater impact of the training (defined here as changing a broader range of cognitive outcomes), it may be necessary to use multiple, domain-specific variants of CBM-I, both in research and in treatment. This is partially in contrast to research suggesting that some fear-relevant learning generalizes across multiple fear domains (e.g., Williams, Kinney, & Falbo, 1989) . Our speculation about the reason for the current findings is that, while not examined in the current study, the greater personal relevance of the stimuli in the match condition increases motivation and elaboration of the material, accounting for the enhanced learning for those in the fear match condition. Beyond testing mechanisms that explain the enhanced effects of training match, it will also be helpful for future research to examine if those trained in a domain that matches their fear will show less fear in other domains (i.e., would those in the Contamination condition show improvement in other fear areas, such as height fear), especially given that anxiety comorbidity is highly prevalent (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 2001) .
With regard to the moderating role of baseline interpretation bias, the findings are less conclusive. Individuals with high levels of baseline negative bias showed greater increases in self-efficacy following contamination training than individuals with low baseline negative bias. A similar, albeit weaker pattern was evident for anxiety controllability (i.e., the effect was present only for the Contamination vs. Sham comparison, but not the Contamination vs. Heights comparison), but not for the other cognitive variables measured. Inconsistent with some past studies that have found that high (vs. low) negative baseline interpretation bias was associated with greater post-training reductions in negative interpretations and increases in positive interpretations (Salemink & Wiers, 2011;  or in an improved interpretation bias ratio score: Micco, Henin, & Hirshfeld-Becker, 2014 , the current study did not find that training was reliably more effective depending on baseline bias (similar to Steinman, 2010) . One possibility for why self-efficacy may have been especially impacted by baseline interpretation bias in the current study is that those individuals who have a predisposition to interpret ambiguous situations negatively also interpret their own abilities negatively (i.e., their self-efficacy) so they have a lot of room to shift these negative beliefs about their abilities.
Limitations and Conclusion
The current study is not without several limitations. As previously mentioned, this was a single-session, proof-ofprinciple study conducted on an analogue, non-treatment seeking sample, which may partly account for some of the null findings (e.g., the lack of behavior and subjective distress effects). Additionally, it may have been useful to control for the variability in participants' height fear in the analyses, which was not assessed in the current study. Furthermore, since the importance of fear domain match was examined using a unidirectional study design (i.e., only those with contamination fear attempted training in a non-fear-matched condition), it will be important to replicate the findings using a full training/outcome domain cross-over design. Also, there is a slightly increased risk for Type 1 error due to the multiple tests conducted. While we considered aggregating some of the cognitive outcomes to reduce the overall number of analyses, we ultimately decided to keep them separate because each provides unique information about the breadth of cognitive change that occurs as a result of training.
Another potential limitation concerns the demographic distribution of our sample. Specifically, our sample included more than three times the frequency of Asian participants compared to the total undergraduate population of the university where data collection occurred. This may suggest that Asian students interpret questions on the PI-R differently than other ethnic groups, which could lead to differences in scores that are not reflective of true clinical severity. Indeed, one study found that Asian participants scored significantly higher on the PI-R than other ethnic groups, and that scores on the PI-R were less strongly correlated with OCD severity in Southeast Asians than in other ethnic groups (Washington, Norton, & Temple, 2008) . This suggests that our sample may have been less contamination fearful at baseline than their PI-R scores indicated. In light of these considerations, it would be worthwhile to replicate this procedure with a diagnosed clinical sample using multiple training sessions. Also, it was deemed important to make minor modifications to some measures to more directly assess future-oriented cognitions specific to contamination concerns, but this may have also altered the measures' psychometric properties. Finally, participants were not assessed for whether they knew the purpose of the CBM-I training; however, when we have assessed this awareness directly in past studies, it did not affect results (e.g., Clerkin & Teachman, 2011) .
Notwithstanding these limitations, the current study revealed that fear-domain match of training materials is an important factor in determining the efficacy of CBM-I. Furthermore, baseline interpretation bias appears to play a somewhat limited role in the effects of the training. In addition, the current study examined the effects of the training across a wider range of variables than is typical in CBM-I studies, helping to elucidate the boundaries of CBM-I's effects. Importantly, these findings offer initial evidence that CBM-I is successfully able to reduce maladaptive cognitive processes associated with anxiety pathology beyond interpretation bias. While we acknowledge the small effect sizes in the current study, we remain optimistic about the potential impact of CBM-I considering that change, albeit small, in multiple cognitive symptoms occurred in just one, brief training session. However, more generally, we expect that CBM-I will be effective for some people, but not others (as is true for essentially all interventions), and future work is critical to determine who is likely to benefit from CBM-I as a standalone training vs. as a pre-treatment training (e.g., to make people more open to doing exposure therapy) vs. as a booster to help maintain post-treatment gains, among other uses. Overall, CBM-I remains an intriguing paradigm that warrants further investigation to enhance its clinical effects.
